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Clearing Some Worldwide Haze

Clearing Some
Worldwide Haze: Daniel
Bodansky’s The Art and
Craft of International
Environmental Law
Victor B. Flatt*

Perhaps no legal discipline is as maligned and misunderstood as International
Environmental Law. The first words of Daniel Bodansky’s excellent new book, The Art and
Craft of International Environmental Law, are a quote by scholar J.L. Brierly, who noted
that, “[t]oo many people assume . . . that international law is and always has been a sham.”1
In the same chapter, Professor Bodansky himself notes that the “Environmental” subdiscipline of international law, which is relatively new, is even more difficult to characterize
as “law,” as some understand the term.2 But importantly, before the end of chapter one,
Professor Bodansky does note that persons and states do act in ways that seem to give
credence to international environmental law, and thus, “it matters.”3
This first chapter alone provides a good self-contained explanation of how International
Environmental Law is a discipline and why, and this itself is a very valuable reading
assignment for persons interested in the area.4 But the book goes so much further. In its 300
plus pages, it explicates the evolution of International Environmental Law, its various
normative components, the major players, and most helpfully, how it actually works and can
perhaps be made to work better. As a professor who teaches International Environmental
Law and a scholar who has studied international attempts at climate change control, I can
say this is the best single source book I have read in setting out and explaining how the whole
thing works. Professor Bodansky notes his history of being a negotiator of international
agreements, and the book does take an “insider’s view” of how law is made and operates. But
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it does so with the scholar’s inquisitive eye. Rather than merely describe what happens,
Professor Bodansky attempts, and I believe succeeds, in explaining the hows and whys.
Among the best parts of the book are Professor Bodansky’s explication of the difference
between laws and policies and how even a normative idea may have elements of “law.” He
also explains how international law is more than just treaties and, in particular, what
“custom” is and how it is generated. With respect to “custom” in International Law, he
correctly notes that “custom” is not necessarily related to the actual custom of nations, but
instead to their aspirations — what they “should” do.5 He then describes how it can have real
effect, by noting that:
These Principles operate as meta-rules, which establish the context within which
bargaining takes place to develop more specific norms. . . Although they do not determine the
result, they channel the negotiations by setting the terms of the debate, providing evaluative
standards, and serving as a basis to criticize other states’ proposals.6
Bodansky also does an excellent job of explaining that the players in the international
environmental law arena are not just the states, but other parties and the constituent
components of the state. He neither embraces nor rejects the theory that states “act in their
own self-interest,” but quite expertly shows how a state’s “self-interest” is itself made up of
the interests of domestic parties and institutions. While much of this is relevant and of
interest to scholars of international law generally, Professor Bodansky does stake out an
important distinction for international environmental law — that because it tries to solve
worldwide problems, it may, more than most other international law, bring states to a
cooperative stance as cooperative action allows all to benefit.
Given my admiration for the book, it seems a bit churlish to quibble with any of it, but
there is one area that I thought deserved more examination and closer scrutiny, and that is
the importance of rights and equity. But lest I bury Bodansky and fail to praise him, I also
want to give hearty applause to his important and thorough discussion of the role of
individuals and personal beliefs in forming international environmental law.

I. The Importance of Rights and Equity to the Debate
In Chapter 4, Prescribing the Cure: Environmental Policy 101, Professor Bodansky reviews
what might be called environmental policy implementation devices or methods that can be
brought to bear to address environmental problems set out in the previous chapter. This is
clearly an important cog in the understanding of International Environmental Law because it
explores what is possible — how can we address international environmental problems?
In answering that question, Professor Bodansky notes the importance of first defining the
goals of the solution and then privileges two options which he calls the “absolutist
approaches” and the “balancing approaches.”7 He characterizes the absolutist approaches in
terms of cleaning the environment no matter what the cost, while characterizing the

5.
6.
7.

222

Id. at 196-99.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 59-63.

Clearing Some Worldwide Haze

balancing approaches by weighing costs and benefits of environmental controls.8 While these
are two broad ways of looking at norms of environmental protection, and while Professor
Bodansky clearly understands that both positions are nuanced, I think this discussion
deserves more explanation.
As Professor Bodansky rightly points out, answering the “goals” questions is probably the
most important consideration of international environmental law,9 and importantly, this
question can be bound up with how one approaches facts about problems and solutions.10 In
other words, if goals themselves are not clear, nothing else from negotiation to
implementation will be clear either.11 In this instance, the so-called absolutist approaches
should perhaps be broken down even more into what kinds of absolutist approaches exist.
Professor Bodansky notes the possibilities of 1) “nature” having its own rights, and 2) a
human right to the environment,12 but these approaches are not created equally, certainly not
in the realm of international environmental law. The issues of what persons or societies have
entitlements to be free from environmental harm or a right to compensation is incredibly
important, possibly a driving factor in many international environmental law problems.13
Professor Bodansky refers to this fact often throughout the book in his discussion of the norm
of avoiding trans-boundary environmental harm, the discussion of the importance of equity,
and how the solution to anthropogenic climate change has and should proceed. Indeed in
Chapter Four, Professor Bodansky identifies equity as a consideration in terms of
implementation of goals.14 While none of this is incorrect, I think the importance of human
entitlement is more important to the story of International Environmental Law than
Professor Bodansky provides.
As an illustration, we can look at the ongoing negotiations over climate change. As
Professor Bodansky notes, before the Kyoto Protocol, much of the discussion of which country
should do what was focused on equity.15 The position of many of the developing countries was
that any solution must grant each country a fair share of emissions, possibly an allotment of
per capita emissions.16 Those that did not use all of them could sell them or bargain with
countries that needed more, but that this should be the beginning position.17 The huge swing
this would have made in the status quo entitlement made it seem almost impossible for some
negotiators, yet it was one of the original staked positions.18 This position in turn made
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possible the principle of shared but divergent responsibility for solutions — that the
developed world should bear the burden of greenhouse gas control.19 This view was partly
justified by the wealth of the developed world; it was even more justified by the historic
contributions to the problem and the resulting industrialization from which the developed
world benefitted.20 Ultimately, this explains why the countries of Eastern Europe, poorer
than many of the other developing countries excluded from mandatory reductions, were
joined with the countries with mandatory controls.21
Equity is also an important factor in the continued evolution of positions, culminating in
the latest agreement in Durban for the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17), which took
place just scant weeks ago. At the time of the of COP15, the 15th conference, which was held
in Copenhagen, the positions of countries, particularly that of the United States, shifted to
the belief that major developing countries needed binding limits on their emissions.22 While
no one suggested that the limits should be equivalent to reductions for the developed
countries, the importance of this issue drove these and subsequent negotiations. Why? To be
sure, some of the developing countries were richer in 2009 than in 1993 and, from a practical
standpoint, it was easy to argue that reductions only from the developed world would not
address the problem, especially when China had moved into the position of being the world’s
largest emitter of greenhouse gases.23 But perhaps this is a push towards equity, given that
the major developing countries incrementally became such large producers of greenhouse
gases.24 In addition to China’s status as the largest emitter, India is moving into the number
three position.25
It is certainly not the case that these countries have failed to take steps to foster
reductions. In fact, China’s energy efficient campaign for automobiles and electricity
production have led to the largest drop in emissions intensity ever recorded.26 Why, then, did
these countries finally agree to monitored caps, albeit weaker ones? Because without them,
equity for even poorer developing countries and low-lying island nations would be stretched to
the breaking point. China and India may not be wealthy, but in 2011, their contributions to
this worldwide climate change problem, whose effects fall on the poorest countries, amounted
to more than 26% of total emissions.27 To not have them agree to something is clearly
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inequitable at this time, though it would not have been inequitable from the perspective of
1993. Indeed, just in two short years, many developing countries moved away from the
Chinese position as being the “best” for all developing countries.28 Professor Bodansky did not
have the results from the Durban COP to explicate in his book, but I do think the importance
of equity or “rights based” goals in International Environmental Law have been more
important historically than acknowledged in the book.

II. The Role of Individuals and Social Norms
Kudos to Professor Bodansky for emphasizing the role that individuals can and do play in
the formulation of International Environmental Law. Chapter 6 focuses entirely on the
“players” in the game, but he goes beyond this by noting throughout the book how important
personal values and morality are to the motivations of these players. Professor Bodansky
recognizes the importance that the process and personal interaction can have on swaying the
minds of those that make decisions and moving groups of persons towards consensus.29 This
is a very important insight that has only seen extensive analysis in general since the 1990s.30
Indeed, a whole school of thought in international law that focuses on the self-interest of
states would deny that individual motivations or internal politics could play an important
role in moving the debate.31
But Professor Bodansky notes many deviations from this state self-interest model: from
“norm entrepreneurs” that try to push a particular idea or cause to the forefront, to
representatives of smaller countries who follow their own personal values because they often
have no formal instruction on how to proceed in international environmental negotiations.32
Professor Bodansky also notes that by participating in the process over time, many of the
personnel who actually do or facilitate the negotiations may “buy in” in a certain way that
affects the movement of negotiations.33
This seems plausible as it echoes similar observations that have noted the role that
socialization and individuals can play in the domestic debate over environmental issues.34
Professor Michael Vandenbergh notes that individual norm creation can affect huge
environmental problems.35 It seems that such norm creation may be even more prevalent and
possible in the close-knit community of international environmental negotiators and players.
Given the vociferous debate over whether or not travelling to international conferences on
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climate change was “worth it” in terms of carbon emissions, this is an observation that many
environmental law professors have failed to acknowledge.36
This insight is also critical to how Professor Bodansky explains the ways that
International Environmental Law can be formed. He discusses two models: “deep and
narrow” or “broad and shallow.”37 The deep and narrow can work with a small number of
countries that have similar interests and can eventually attract others who see how it works
and how they can benefit.38 For the initial small group of countries, such an approach
ultimately reduces the need for ineffective compromise to attract more participants and also
reduces uncertainty.39 This has been the model for the European Union.40 However, for
worldwide problems that involve the global environment, the broad and shallow may be the
only option. That is — an agreement that attracts many if not most of the potential
adherents, but does so by binding them to very shallow commitments.41 But because of the
process of individual buy-in, shallow commitments can grow deeper over time. According to
Professor Bodansky, “[F]ramework conventions…can create positive feedback loops that
facilitate the deepening of the regime through the adoption of protocols containing specific
substantive commitments.”42
In fact, it is unusual for states to leave agreements even as they become more stringent,
and Bodansky explains this with the buy-in theory.43 Once a country has ratified a treaty, it
begins implementation, which may also require changes in domestic law. Withdrawal can
pull apart many interconnected strands. The attention focused on Canada’s exit from the
Kyoto Protocol suggests that it is the exception that supports Bodansky’s theory.44 Canadian
Member of Parliament and Green Leader Elizabeth May stated:
Not only has Canada just ended our commitments under an international treaty, I
believe we are in violation of domestic law. The Kyoto Implementation Act was passed
by the House of Commons in 2007 and has royal assent. It requires Canada to continue
reporting and doing its job, fulfilling its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. I wonder
that the prime minister of this country thinks he can withdraw us from an
international treaty which was ratified by the House of Commons with no discussion in
the House, and violate a domestic law with no discussion in the House.45
Such rhetoric underscores again how important international law really is to creating
change in the world, and Professor Bodansky’s book is a marvelous explanation of how that
can actually occur. Far from being “unreal,” international environmental law is very real, has
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had major impacts on our world, and will continue to do so over time. It may not be as
predictable a science, but it is very real. Professor Bodansky does us a great service by
explaining how and why in his very readable book, The Art and Craft of International Law.
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